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II: Our Kingdom Had no Head 
  
THE situation after 1286, when Alexander III died leaving an uncertain 
succession, was little changed. An aristocratic community chose aristocratic 
Guardians: two bishops, two earls, two barons. They restrained the maverick 
pretensions of Robert Bruce and set about finding a king through the marriage of 
the kingdom's heiress, Alexander III's granddaughter. They were glad to fall in 
with Edward I in a plan for marriage to his son which would give the two 
kingdoms to one person, but which made elaborate provision for the protection of 
Scottish interests by attempting to separate the machinery of government from the 
king's person. The kingdom was to be separate and free, ecclesiastically, feudally 
and judicially self-sufficient, its offices filled by Scotsmen, its heirs in wardship 
free of disparagement, its business dealt with in parliament within Scotland, and its 
taxation for its own customary needs only. If this looks remarkably like a charter 
of baronial liberties granted in return for the Scottish throne we must remember 
that the liberties of other Scots were, in contemporary eyes, protected by those of 
barons; the treaty should have secured the kingdom from English exploitation, and 
at the same time preserved it from English hostility and the domestic upheaval 
threatened by Bruce. But homage was owed to the king and commands flowed 
from him; in accepting an English king, therefore, the Scots were acknowledging a 
trust and understanding which grew out of peace and common language. Scots 
were not so different from Englishmen that allegiance to one king was 
unimaginable.  
The treaty of Birgham was not fulfilled because the heiress died, but the 
subsequent course of events bears out this analysis. The Scottish community 
invited Edward I to help them find the next heir to their kingdom, and when faced 
with his demand for homage took refuge in wordy evasion instead of dignified re-
fusal. Edward persisted and, under what pressure we do not know, the Scots 
capitulated, obtaining from Edward the promise that judicial appeals would not 
leave Scotland; and indeed they did not so long as the court hearing the case about 
succession to the throne (the 'Great Cause') was in being. Once John Balliol was 
adjudged heir and became king, it was just such appeals that Edward insisted 
upon. When KingJohn eventually appeared at Westminster to answer the appeal of 
Macduff his plea was disingenuous but revealing: that he dared not answer on a 
matter touching his kingdom without consulting the probi homines thereof. Since he 
had come from Scotland probably with this answer prepared on the advice of just 
such probi homines, it tells us plainly of the convention of government by the king 
with baronial advice and it is also the first Scottish example of a baronial front for 
royal evasion. The strength of Scottish feeling over appeals to Westminster is 
understandable in a kingdom which had no professional bench but only an un-
differentiated king's curia or colloquium with prelates and barons; such appeals 
were an infringement of nationality (in modern terms), of the liberty of the realm 
(in the language of. the 1290S), of the traditions ofa governing baronage. When the 
king capitulated to Edward I, the community ousted him from government and 
entrusted power to a council of four prelates, four earls and four barons, a body so 
markedly aristocratic that English contemporaries thought it modelled on the 
twelve peers of France. Recognizing the character of English lordship and the 
likelihood of war, this Scottish government made an alliance with France. If any 
possibility of renegotiation of the relationship with England had existed, this must 
have put paid to it.  
The failure of this baronial rebellion was complete and ignominious; after 
the battle of Dun bar on 27 April, 1296, Scotland became a vassal lordship and 
many nobles and lairds were held to ransom in England. The new administration 
was staffed by Englishmen and a systematic attempt was made to secure a formal 
profession of loyalty from everyone of significance in the kingdom. Whereas on 
the first (peaceful) capitulation of the Scots in 1291 the collecting of fealties was 
pursued only desultorily, there was in 1296 a much more rigorous scheme which 
left the English king in possession of sealed undertakings from some two 
thousand clerics, barons, knights and freeholders from all Lowland parts of the 
kingdom. The military service required of all free landowners had become, at the 
behest of Edward I, a political responsibility. The community was not enough; 
Edward looked beyond it to the lesser men who, silently accepting its leadership, 
had 'followed the Lion' to defeat at Dunbar.  
Unfortunately we know all too little of the conduct of government in the 
years 1296-7; the Scots were later to claim oppression and extortion: at the time the 
English complained bitterly of their inability to raise any income in Scotland. 
Revolt was to some extent 'in the air'; in an occupied land there were doubtless 
petty oppressions and many criminal acts passing for patriotic resistance. Yet it is 
difficult to estimate the significance of the three risings of 1297, difficult because 
the Scots left no records while a bewildered government left its trail of belated half 
measures. But while the risings ofWilliam Wallace and Andrew Moray took the 
government by surprise, the same was not true of that led by Robert Bruce 
(grandson of the Competitor and later king) which was quickly cornered at Irvine in 
Ayrshire and collapsed. Significantly a baron of middling rank, Sir William 
Douglas, who had a deserved reputation for violence, first joined the rising of Wall 
ace but later, it seems, moved into Bruce's camp and so surrendered himself; 
perhaps we may see in this shift the attraction of Bruce's social position. More 
striking however is the thinness of support for Bruce's rising, which must have been 
regarded by most Scottish barons as a bid for the throne to which Bruce was 
convinced he had a right. The tergiversations which mar his career, his rejection of 
King John and support of Edward I in 1296, the rising of 1297, submission of 1301-
2, conspiracy of 1304 and rising of 1306 are all attributable to this conviction and 
ambition. Bruce was not responsible for the coups attempted by his grandfather 
against the Scottish government nor for his grandfather's ready invitation to Edward 
I to intervene on his behalf, yet the Scots of 1297 knew that the motives of 
grandfather and grandson were the same, for in 1296 with his father (and in 1301-2 
on his own) Bruce invited Edward to make a Bruce king - vassal king - over a 
reluctant and defeated Scotland. There was little enthusiasm for a rising with so 
compromised a leader.  
The rising of Andrew Moray (head of the most prominent baronial family in 
Moray) drew support from the burgesses of Inverness. The English charged earls 
and other barons of the north to suppress it, but they neither did this nor joined the 
rebels. We do not know the names of Wallace's supporters when he and Moray met 
the English at Stirling Bridge on 11 September, 1297; that the Steward and the earl 
of Lennox tried to help the English procure a Scottish submission, stood aside while 
the battle was fought and then joined in to pillage and kill the defeated English is 
the only known contribution by members of the baronial community to the battle of 
Stirling Bridge. The most coherent commentator, the Guisborough chronicler, 
speaks of the Scottish magnates who capitulated at Irvine stipulating for 'all their 
ancient rights and customs', while William Wallace 'brought the people into one 
body' (abunadat populum). He was strengthened by an immense number of Scots in 
that the 'community of the land followed him like a leader and prince. The whole 
following (familia) of the magnates adhered to him and though the magnates them-
selves were with [the English] king in body, their hearts were far from him'. Both 
the Irvine magnates and Wallace and Moray claimed some association with the 
community of the realm, but the latter were also 'leaders of the army of the realm'. 
If contemporaries saw only a military significance in 'army' we are entitled to read 
into it the social groups offree landholderslesser knights, freeholders and rich 
peasants - who had hitherto had no part in politics but now rose voluntarily arid 
gathered without aristocratic leadership 'to defend ourselves and to free our 
kingdom' (Guisborough's account of Wallace's message to the English in 1297).  
We must be careful how we designate this rising. It was perhaps 'popular' 
but it was not revolutionary for there is little hint of radicalism - social, political or 
religious - about it. As with earlier troubles in England when the tithe barns of 
foreign clergy were burned, its xenophobia fed as much on legendary oppressions 
and half-truths as on fact. The English king had left a conquered Scotland in 1296 
in order to raise from an already heavily taxed England as much in men and 
money as he could; he entered on the greatest crisis of his reign. There is reason to 
think that some at least of his measures to raise armies for Flanders and Gascony 
were extended to Scotland. A prise of all wool was certainly ordered, although we 
know of it only from a petition of 1305, and an attempt made through the Anglo-
Scottish government at Berwick to exact service from the Scottish magnates. Now 
in England in addition to a prise of wool, Edward ordered the service, ready for 
war, of a 'motley throng', all barons, knights and others with land worth £20 
annually. The Scots believed he intended a similar exaction among themselves - 
'that he would have seized all the middle folk (menzane) to send them overseas on 
his war' but our evidence is so fragmentary that we do not know how well justified 
this belief was. Doubtless the barons were urged to bring retinues, but the 
government is likely to have gone further than that in its demands; it is 
conceivable that it tried to exploit the 'common army' of the realm.  
The effects of such demands need no underlining. The 'middle folk', rich 
husbandmen, freeholders, poor knights, lived in a harshly competitive 
environment on the fringes of solvency, and poorer folk on the fringes of 
starvation. Their struggle for more land and good marriages, for social betterment, 
made their social standing vulnerable to small misfortunes such as the seizure of a 
cash crop, wool; far worse was the threat (even if only an unfounded rumour) to 
sweep them from their homes into a distant overseas war. In England, Edward I 
met only passive resistance; in Scotland he met William Wallace, Andrew Moray 
and the 'army of Scotland'. Their aim as reported by Guisborough, 'to defend 
ourselves', and the title, style and conduct of the leaders are alike backward-
looking and conservative: the restoration of the old kingship and of Kingjohn as 
well as the expulsion of the English.  
But suddenly Anglo-Scottish relations were no longer the relations 
between one king and another, a domain for private regulation by two men. They 
were now the concern of a substantial and vocal minority of the population, not 
particularly well informed but possessed of traditional military power and so 
capable of clearing the English out of all but the most southerly parts of Scotland. 
The actions of this minority are not generally compared with the mellowing 
fruitfulness of English constitutional practice, where the knights and franklins of 
the shires grew from management of local affairs to a silent pressure and then an 
articulate voice in the debate of government. But the Scottish rising represented 
the sudden assertion of their importance by a comparable social group. This 
change was much more violent in Scotland because the ruling class of magnates 
had failed much more suddenly and completely to protect the interests of their 
inferiors than was ever the case in England. Broken by their defeat of 1296, they 
accepted the English peace in Scotland and took service with the English in their 
war in France. The recovery of their natural leadership was slow; and of course 
the balance of internal power was never again what it had been in the Scotland of 
1296.  
The evidence for participation at the battle of Falkirk in 1298 is 
inconclusive but suggests that while a few lesser barons may have joined 
Wallace, almost all the magnates (some of whom had deserted Edward I in 
Flanders) sent along their retinues but did not themselves fight. If present, it was 
in the cavalry, which turned tail and fled at the beginning of the battle. The hatred 
of Edward I for Wall ace is beyond doubt; it is less clear but still likely on our 
evidence that Wallace was distrusted or disliked by the Scottish magnates and that 
the feeling was mutuaL His warfare was violent and cruel: the sheriff of Lanark 
and the treasurer of Scotland were cut into little pieces after being killed, and the 
invasion of the northern counties of England in 1297 was a trail of atrocities. Such 
conduct, though threatened, was never carried out by Edward I against the Scots 
until, perhaps, 1306-7. It made baronial truce or peace and the preservation of 
inheritance after rebellion difficult to achieve; it does however fit well with the 
popular reputation of Wallace handed down in gestes (of which only one survives in 
literary form) and recorded by a fifteenth· century chronicler, as the ruthless 
enemy of injustice, represented in his case by a foreign king and his foraging 
garrisons. There was in Wallace's rising an undoubted element of protest by the 
'poor commons' against their sufferings at the hands of a harsh and repressive 
society. It was at least said that his army contained many scoundrels and this 
would be inevitable if, as his later reputation reported, he insisted upon the service 
in the army of every able-bodied adult male. This reputation may be inaccurate in 
its detail but it is important evidence that Wall ace was not just another Guardian 
of the Realm chosen by the community thereof, but the leader of a popular 
movement with a measure of social discontent in its makeup. Such a view is not 
expounded by thirteenth-century sources and won for the survivors ofFalkirk no 
place in the 'Community of the Realm'. It depends upon a popular view of Wall 
ace which cannot be traced in any detail before the fifteenth century. But enough 
is known to suggest that 1297-8 was a rising of peasants and therefore a sign of 
social change. William Wallace's authority as Guardian did not long survive the 
defeat and during the six years after Falkirk we can see the magnates struggling to 
direct the impetus of the war but divided by jealousies and distrust and so wanting 
in decisive leadership. In 1299 Wallace left the country without leave, returning in 
1303 to help the community (now in dire straits) in its war against Edward 1. But 
in their submission in 1304 the Scots magnates were pressed by Edward to hunt 
down Wallace and in 1305 Sir John Menteith (an early supporter of Robert I, and a 
baron of the declaration of Arbroath) was responsible for his betrayal. Wallace's 
execution was the first in which a half-strangled man was disembowelled and 
beheaded; he was no ordinary enemy.  
In the baronial-led resistance to Edward I after 1298 there is evidence that 
the Scots were able to field modest armies raised from the freeholders of the realm. 
Their resistance showed a toughness and resource quite different from the collapse 
after Dunbar in 1296, but it was defensive, not the aggressive warfare led by 
William Wallace, and there was no effort to raise a large army such as had been 
destroyed at Falkirk. Diplomatically the Scots did well at the Roman curia which 
served as an international forum. Their high-flown and well-justified claims won 
them a paper victory (the bull Scimus fili of 1299) which was belied by the tone of 
their real negotiations with Edward. The government pressed for the return of King 
John (who had no wish to come) and for a peace which would recognize him with 
restoration oflands, if necessary by purchase. The recognition of English 
overlordship seems to be implied by this last suggestion. At the end of the day 
(1304), and in spite of bold answers to King Edward that right would overcome 
might, that he would be resisted to the last, Guardian and community capitulated in 
return for security in their lands: they had no alternative for they had been driven 
from the castles which represented their - or Edward's - hold on the kingdom.  
Whereas in 1295 the Scottish 'community' set aside King John's authority to 
escape the logic of Edward's overlordship, in 1300 they argued for his return 
apparently as a condition for accepting that lordship. The explanation is surely the 
different motives for the rebellions: 1296 a defence of a narrowly aristocratic 
tradition of government; 1297 a defence of free men of some substance from the 
locusts of English administration. If overlordship must be accepted, at least a 
Scottish king will appoint native officials and preserve customary dues. It is 
doubtful whether King John had any wish to defend either interest but his kingship 
had become the only chance of even a modest freedom from direct rule by 
Englishmen. The point was taken by Edward I who after the submission of 1304 
tried to create the conditions for a settlement of astonishing moderation. The Scots 
were consulted - not merely the aristocracy but freeholders were present at an 
assembly at Perth in 1305 - and chose ten representatives including two knights 
representing the 'communities' north and south. of Forth, to attend parliament in 
London. The consequent ordinance of 1305 for governing Scotland appointed 
Englishmen to the three central offices but with a council of Scottish prelates and 
barons, paired an Englishman and a Scot in each of four commissions of justiciary 
and gave most local offices to Scotsmen. This measure, which contrasts with the 
intrusion of Englishmen in 1296, may be regarded as conciliatory toward the office-
holders (mainly Scottish barons) but it is also a recognition that the local 
communities of freeholders resented English officials and that these communities 
could not be ignored. In Lothian, where English control had been easiest to 
maintain, the sheriffs were Englishmen, for here the local communities need not be 
feared. But the strategic castle of Stirling was handed over to a Scot. 
 
 
